Preliminaries

[𝑘]: the set {0
k - 1} Δ𝑘: set of all probability distributions over [𝑘]

agent chooses from [𝑛] actions, and there are [𝑚] possible outcomes

  • each action associated w/ distribution of outcomes 𝑓∈Δ𝑚 as well as cost 𝑐
  • (𝑓,𝑐) is privately known only to the agent
  • also assume 𝑐0 = 𝑟0

reward for each outcome 𝑟𝑖 is known to both agent and principal (person giving the contract)

  • also assume 𝑟0=0

Contract Classes

a contract 𝑡 is linear if 𝑡=đ›Œđ‘Ÿ (that is, agent is rewarded with constant fraction of reward produced)

Lemma

Expected reward only changes at most 𝑛−1 times as đ›Œ increases from 0 to 1. Moreover, expected reward is non-decreasing.

Recall that utility = expected reward - expected payment.

For instance, if for any agent, the best linear contract were only 0.25 worse than the best bounded contract, đ¶linear would be a 0.25 approximation of đ¶bounded.

visualization of this condition (solid is sampled distribution, solid is true distribution). x-axis is 𝑝-axis, and for all 𝑝 there is at most 𝜀 error.

visual proof:

if we pick our strategy at the red dot, we can incur at worst 2𝜀 error from the true answer.